ABSTRACT: College students were assigned to 2 groups of 4 participants each in a reversal design. On each trial participants chose individually how many tokens to bet, and then collectively chose a row on an 8x8 matrix with a plus or minus sign in each cell. After that the experimenter announced a column that determined whether the group won or lost the bets. Before the trial ended, participants had to distribute their earnings. In experimental condition A the group won in trials after distributing proceeds equally on the previous trial, and in condition B they won only after unequal distribution in the previous trial. Results show that the external contingency on distribution (or, as we suggest, metacontingency) selected the groups' distribution of their earnings.
more) organisms where each organism's behavior is among the environmental variables accounting for the behavior of the other(s) (Skinner, 1953, p. 304 ). Skinner (1957) and others (e.g., Glenn 1991; Mattaini, 1996) called such interrelated operant contingencies interlocking behavioral contingencies.
The term interlocking contingencies of reinforcement emphasizes that one person's actions or their effects (or features associated with them) function as another person's environment, therefore increasing the relevance of the behavior of each as the significant behavioral environment of the other.
It has been suggested that interlocking contingencies of reinforcement can themselves be selected by external consequences in a third level of selection by consequences; and that the contingencies describing relations between interlocking behavioral contingencies and cultural level consequences be termed metacontingencies (Glenn, 1986 (Glenn, , 1988 (Glenn, , 1991 (Glenn, , 2004 Glenn & Malott, 2004; Malott & Glenn, 2006) : They comprise a unit of analysis that is distinct from the contingencies of operant reinforcement of individual behavior although their fundamental components include operant contingencies.
Metacontingencies are defined as interlocking behavioral contingencies (IBCs) that produce an aggregate effect (that could not be produced otherwise) on which the action of an external environment is contingent. The action of the external environment is called a cultural consequence. Paralleling the contingencies of reinforcement that account for the origin and maintenance of operant behavior, metacontingencies account for the origin and maintenance of IBCs and their effects. The results are lineages of responses (in operant selection processes) and lineages of IBCs (in cultural selection processes). As such, metacontingencies are deemed a unit of analysis (albeit not the only one) of cultural practices (Glenn, 2004) .
The concept of metacontingency could help account for the origin and evolution of such cultural level entities as schools, legislatures, and businesses, which have cultural practices tailored to their functions in the larger culture.
Social behavior and its relation to cultures were early concerns in behavior analysis, for both conceptual and pragmatic reasons: Following the publication of Walden II (Skinner, 1948) and the explicit concern with social behavior in the first textbooks in behavior analysis (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; Skinner, 1953) , one finds a stream of publications since the 1950s that deal with the phenomena of social behavior. These include applied and interpretive work (e.g., Kunkel, 1970 Kunkel, , 1985 Kunkel, , 1986 Mattaini, 1996; Rakos, 1991) as well as experimental reports (e.g., Azrin & Lindsley, 1956; Hake, Donaldson & Hyten, 1983; Hake & Vukelich, 1972; Schmitt, 1976; Skinner, 1962) .
One feature common to all of the quoted experimental work is their reliance on contingencies of reinforcement as the unit of analysis. These experiments did not deal with the emergence of cultural units of analysis that may arise from relations between interlocking behavioral contingencies (necessarily involving more than one organism) and consequences contingent on the characteristics or effects of those IBCs.
During the same time period other experimental traditions, mostly in experimental social psychology and experimental sociology, focused on social behavior and tried to deal with what was taken as specificities of social interactions: the transmission of learned behavior over generations (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; Weick & Gilfillan, 1971) , and the effects of immediate consequences and of delayed or external consequences on individual behavior and group organization/structure (Wiggins, 1969) . Wiggins (1969) distinguished between experiments on groups (or experimental microcultures) that investigated the effects of antecedents or consequences for the behavior of individuals participating in a group (for instance, Bavelas, Hastorf, Gross, & Kite, 1965; Pierce, 1975 Pierce, , 1977 and those experiments investigating the effects of consequences external to the group as a whole (Wiggins, 1969 and also Elliot & Meeker, 1984; Gray, Griffith, von Broembsen, & Sullivan, 1982; Gray, Judson & Duran-Aydintug, 1993; Griffith & Gray, 1978; Judson & Gray, 1990) . The independent variable in the latter experiments may be viewed as the contingency between the (internal) interlocking contingencies of reinforcement and the consequences external to those IBCs. The dependent variable was the performance of the group as a functional unit (as in Figure 1 ).
In that light, these experiments could be taken as possible models for the experimental analysis of metacontingencies. The present work was an attempt to develop such an analog, based on Wiggins' experimental work. Wiggins (1969) worked with ten experimental groups, each one with three players. Roles were assigned to each player: a leader was in charge of making decisions, a secretary had privileged information that could not be shared with the others but could increase the group's probability of success, and a treasurer handled the group's winnings. The leader had to bet more money than the other two, the secretary bet 7 cents, and the treasurer bet 4 cents on each trial. Each group of players was submitted to 10 experimental sessions, each with 30 trials. After individually betting some of their money on each trial, the group's task was to choose a row in a 7x7 matrix. The matrix was placed on a board and cells were marked with either a plus or a minus sign. After the group's choice the experimenter announced his choice of a column. If the cell formed by the group's and experimenter's choice had a plus sign, the players won 30 cents (a "successful" trial). If the cell had a minus sign, the players lost part of their bet (an "unsuccessful" trial). Once money was gained or lost, the players decided what the payment for each player should be, and a new trial began. Thus "success" or "failure" followed in time the group choice of row, but the plus ("success") or minus ("failure") sign was contingent on the players' distribution of tokens in the previous trial.
In some conditions, the group achieved a plus signal by distributing money from the previous trial unequally and in other conditions for distributing their money equally. Wiggins' results indicated that the "external contingency" controlled the groups' distributive strategies: Players distributed the earnings equally or unequally depending on the experimental condition.
Wiggins' experiment may be viewed as manipulating metacontingencies to show control over the interlocking behavioral contingencies that produced equal and unequal distributions. However, his data were based on a group design and variables such as the different tasks assigned to each participant may have reduced or increased the probabilities of occurrence of IBCs related to one or other pattern of distribution. The present study was based on Wiggins experimental design, but the experimental question was: if the success (reinforcement) of individual behaviors (like betting money) is made dependent on an effect (equal or unequal distribution of earnings) that is the consequence of other behaviors that can only be emitted if all members of a group concur (the decision of splitting the earnings equally or unequally), will such a consequence differentially select interactions (IBCs) that lead to success? Or else is it possible to change the interactions in a small group by making consequences contingent on an aggregate outcome of group performance?
In this experiment IBCs of unspecified topography, composed mainly of verbal antecedents, behaviors and consequences, resulted in one of two aggregate products: equal or unequal distributions of money among participants (the dependent variable). A [meta]contingency was established by the experimenter's manipulating the relation between the types of divisions and their interrelated IBCs (DV) and the cultural consequence (IV) that is group's "winning" or "losing" on the subsequent trial (as shown in Figure 1 ). In some conditions, IBCs producing unequal distributions on the previous trial resulted in "winning" on the next trial; in other conditions IBCs producing equal distributions on the previous trial resulted in "winning" on the next trial.
METHOD Participants
Eight college students, ages 18 to 22, seven of them female, accepted an invitation to participate in an experimental study about social interactions. Each participant was informed the experiment would last up to 12 experimental sessions of about 1 hour.
Students were assigned to one of two experimental groups of four participants. Sessions occurred when at least three participants of the group were present.
Setting
Sessions were conducted in a classroom furnished with a table and chairs. Participants sat around the table where there was a glass jar (called players' pool) was placed on the table. Each participant had a notepad and pencil.
On one wall there was a cardboard chart with a matrix of eight columns and eight rows. Each column had a different color and each row was numbered from 1 to 8. Half of the cells had a black plus (+) sign and the other half had a black minus (-) sign. Signs were randomly distributed in the matrix.
A side table held refreshments and food items. The experimenter and two research assistants were present during sessions, seated in chairs behind the participants. A video camera recorded sessions.
Procedure

Instructions
At the onset of the first experimental session each participant received written instructions. The instructions stated they would be "playing a game" and outlined the rules of the game, the expected duration of the experiment, and asked participants not to discuss the experiment outside the experimental room.
Experimental Sessions
Each experimental session comprised 30 rounds (or trials). Each participant received 110 tokens-worth 1 cent in Brazilian currency-at the beginning of each session. Tokens were exchanged for money at the end of the session.
The goal of the game was to earn tokens. On each trial, individual participants placed a bet by putting between 3 and 10 tokens in front of him/her on the table. After all bets were made, the group of participants had 90-sec to choose a row on the matrix and call the row number. Then the experimenter made public his choice of a column by announcing its color. If the intersecting cell had a plus sign the experimenter added the same number of tokens as bet by the group. If the intersecting cell had a minus sign the experimenter took half the tokens bet on the round. Participants were told the experimenter chose columns according to a complex rule. In order to systematically win, they should try to discover the rule.
After the experimenter's announcement (and the corresponding payment or taking away of the tokens) the group (a) had to deposit some tokens in the jar (the players' pool) and (b) had to decide how to share among the participants what was left. No participant could be left without tokens on any given trial.
Depositing tokens in the player's pool had two functions: (a) to increase the probability of participants remaining present throughout the experiment, and (b) to induce variability and contact with the experimental condition. This was accomplished through the intervention of the experimenter. Participants were informed (on the initial instructions) that some number of tokens had to be put in the players' pool on every trial and that occasionally the experimenter would decide the amount. The experimenter would announce when it was his turn to decide the savings in the players' pool. Although participants did not know it, the intervention forced a given distribution: when the experimenter announced that a given amount should be put in the players' pool, he did it leaving enough tokens to increase the probability to be distributed either equally (for instance, 4 tokens to be distributed among 4 participants), or unequally (for instance, 5 tokens to be distributed among 4 participants). The players' pool was manipulated by the experimenter one or two times after about five consecutive unsuccessful trials.
Finally, after the deposit to the players' pool, participants were instructed to distribute whatever was left among them as they saw fit. A new trial began after the distribution of the tokens among players. After 30 rounds each participant exchanged the tokens he/she had left for money. After nine sessions with each group the academic year ended and the experiment was interrupted; at the end of the last session the savings in the players' pool (accumulated across sessions) were also distributed among the participants according to their own criterion. Participants could talk freely with each other and could take notes during sessions.
Experimental Design
A reversal design with two experimental conditions was employed. Group 1 was submitted to an A-B-A-B design and Group 2 to a B-A-B design. Group B was not submitted to another A condition because the end of the school year had been reached. Experimental conditions were changed when a group of participants reached the stability criterion of getting a plus sign ("wins") in 10 consecutive rounds.
Experimental condition A: metacontingency favoring equal distributions. The experimenter waited for the group's announcement of a row on the matrix and then announced a column that led to a plus sign if the participants had distributed the tokens equally on the previous round. The only exception was the first round in the first session, when the participants obtained a plus sign.
In this condition, when participants distributed the resulting tokens unequally among themselves, they received in the next round an announcement of column that led to a minus sign (and therefore lost half the amount they bet in that round).
Experimental condition B: metacontingency favoring unequal distribution. In this condition, the experimenter announced columns that led to plus signs whenever participants had distributed the previous round's earnings unequally; and he announced columns that led to minus signs whenever tokens had been equally distributed on the previous round.
Post Session Verbal Report
After the last session each participant answered a questionnaire about the experimental contingencies.
Data Collection
The experimenter and the two research assistants recorded the following events: amount bet by each player on each trial, amount won by each player on each trial, amount deposited to the players' pool, the row chosen on each trial, the column announced on each trial and the subsequent delivery or removal of tokens. The participants' notebooks were collected at the end of the experiment and the written verbal records analyzed. Figure 2 shows cumulative successful trials (trials ending with a plus sign and double bet payment) across the nine experimental sessions and across conditions for each experimental group. Markers indicate trials when the experimenter decided the number of tokens to go in the player's pool, to insure success on the trial's distribution and a positive result (announcement of plus sign) on the following trial. Figure 2 shows both groups reached stability criterion (ten successive successful trials) in every experimental condition, but both did it faster under the equal distribution condition. This may have been because all participants were students in the same college, and classmates. Apparently there was also a training (or history) effect: with the exception of the first experimental condition (equal distribution) for Group 1, criterion was reached with fewer trials in successive experimental conditions. Both the history effect and the difficulty in adhering to unequal distributions are seen in the experimenter's interventions: as Figure 2 shows there were only two interventions in the equal distribution condition for Group 1 (in the third experimental condition) and only one intervention for Group 2 (in the second experimental condition), but 23 and 30 interventions, respectively, were necessary before Groups 1 and 2 reached criterion on their first exposure to the unequal distribution condition.
RESULTS
Selection of Equal and Unequal Distributions as Group Practices
The experimenter's interventions forced a pattern of distribution that had low probability at the moment and therefore induced variations in the players' interactions which led to outcomes (equal/unequal distributions) selected by the environmental consequences. The need for consecutive experimenter's interventions shows that these variations were not instantaneously strengthened. Also, the occurrence of only a few interventions when the unequal distribution condition was first reversed seems to indicate that participants became more sensitive to the experimental metacontingencies, in the sense that if not successful in the previous trial, the participants performed different behaviors related to current distribution patterns.
Of greatest interest, Figure 2 indicates that the experimental metacontingency selected distinct patterns of distribution, either equal or unequal and that these patterns could be reversed when the metacontingency was reversed. Results show that the metacontingency in effect in each condition selected the interlocking behavioral contingencies that produced either equal or unequal distributions. That is: patterns of recurring interactions among participants, those we call IBCs, that produced an unequal or equal distribution were selected by an external environmental consequence in a metacontingency relation. Consequently, these IBCs started to occur more frequently.
The Emergence of Group Coordination and the Betting and Winning Individual Patterns of Behavior
The allocation of the players' winnings (or distribution) was a group decision but it could affect each player differently depending on how each player bet and the group's distribution of tokens on each trial. In Figure 3 the number of tokens bet (closed markers) and won by each player across sessions is represented. Panels on the left column represent Group 1 players and panels on the right column Group 2 players. Line breaks represent experimental condition changes and missing points are in sessions not attended by the participant. As we can see, both groups reached the stability criterion in all conditions and were submitted to the same number of trials (270 trials in nine sessions); the two groups had almost the same number of successful trials (90 trials for Group 1 and 94 for Group 2). Figure 3 suggests that the betting and distributive strategies were not the same for the two groups.
Because the equal distribution metacontingency was in effect for most of Session 1 for Group 1, all players bet 110 tokens and all of them won more than they bet. In the three subsequent sessions the unequal distribution metacontingency was in effect and all Group 1 players bet fewer tokens and by the end of the condition they had around 60% of what they had bet. When the equal condition was reinstated the amount bet by the four players increased once again, but in the first session of this reversal (Session 5) P1 and P2 won almost the same amount they bet, whereas P3 and P4 ended the session losing between 20 and 30% of their bets. After Session 5 their patterns were similar. It is worth noting that, after Session 1, Group 1 players made more money than they bet only in Sessions 7 and 9 (unequal condition). The betting pattern was different for Group 2 players. Although there was a tendency to decrease the number of tokens bet among three Group 1 participants (the exception was P4), Group 2 players showed a stable pattern for the first four sessions followed by a steady increase in tokens bet, with a slight decrease in the last session. Also, the efficiency of the relation between betting and winning of Group 2 participants started to improve in Session 4, and from Session 6 to Session 9 all participants won more than they bet. Although the betting and winning pattern of P4 is slightly different from the others, there seems to be a high degree of coordination among the four participants in all sessions. Group 2 participants also bet more and made more money than Group 1 participants.
Although Groups 1 and 2 were similarly affected by the experimental metacontingencies, repeatedly reaching criteria for unequal and equal distribution, the consequences that selected these aggregate products seem to have selected distinct patterns of interactions among players which were related to each player's betting behavior and winning. Interlocking behavioral contingencies (or the coordination among players) are shown by the similarities on the betting and winning and by the steady tendency to increase betting and winning. In the case of Group 2, individual players coordinated their pattern of interactions over trials, so that all four participants won similar amounts even in condition B (unequal distribution). Their strategy was to take turns betting a higher number of tokens on successive trials and to distribute their winnings according to their bets, which led to an unequal distribution on each trial, and thus to announcements of success, but to similar patterns of betting and winning when the whole condition was taken into account. Although some coordination also emerged with Group 1 players, this coordination was not so well established as in the Group 2: With the exception of Session 5, all present players in each session had similar performances during sessions. But no identifiable pattern is evident across sessions. This may have been, at least in part, a consequence of the three absences of two different players on the Group.
Players' Pool: A Further Measure of Group Coordination
The distribution of the players' pool tokens at the end of the 9 th Session is further evidence of the emergence of interlocking behavioral contingencies. There were 897 tokens in Group 1 players' pool: P1, P2, and P3 were assigned 258 tokens and P4 received 123 tokens, less than half of what the others got. Group 2 saved 763 tokens and distributed them equally: participants P1, P2, and P4 received 191 tokens and P3 received 190. The different distributive strategies of the players' pool are one more instance of the different patterns of interactions that emerged in each group.
Verbal Behavior as a Tool to Measure Relevant Behavior
The notebooks used by each participant were reviewed after the experiment. All participants took notes. The frequency and length of the notes decreased for all participants over time, and some participants stopped taking notes entirely.
Participants recorded a number of events related to the "game": number of tokens bet, number of tokens won, row announced by participants, column announced by experimenter. The decrease in the note taking indicates the participants' inability to describe the experimental conditions.This hypothesis was confirmed by the post-experimental verbal reports. None of the participants described the relevant experimental metacontingencies.
DISCUSSION
The results are consistent with other research reports that stress the relevance of contingencies arranged for a group in order to explain the behaviors of individual participants (Wiggins, 1969; Griffith & Gray, 1978; Judson & Gray, 1990; Gray, Judson & Duran-Aydintug, 1993) . These patterns of behavior can be explained by the selection of IBCs more advantageous in producing the relevant cultural consequence.
The present study shows, as did others (Wiggins, 1969; Elliot & Meeker, 1984; Judson & Gray, 1990; Gray, Judson & Duran-Aydintug, 1993 ) that the interrelated behavior of individuals in groups changes as a function of consequences upon the products of those behaviors. Furthermore, it shows that changes in the behaviors of individuals and the group interactions are reversible; that is, individual and "group" patterns change when "external contingencies" (Wiggins, 1969) change. Here the relevant independent variable was the metacontingency (i.e. dependency) between a given distribution pattern the aggregated outcome produced by IBCs and the winning of tokens by the group as a whole related to a plus sign (the cultural consequence).
Although it took longer for both groups to achieve criterion in the unequal condition (the first condition for Group 2 and the second for Group 1), the stability criterion was reached much faster on subsequent reversals. This result indicates an increasing sensitivity to the relevant experimental conditions. This sensitivity is, possibly, the emergence (via variation in individual player behavior) of patterns of behaviors that allowed for interactions-among players and over trials-which produced the outcomes required by the metacontingency in effect. The selection of behaviors under the control of other member's behaviors is required for the recurrent production of the aggregate outcomes (distributions) and it is this relation between IBCs and their related outcomes that is selected by the cultural consequence manipulated by the experimenter.
The increase in the malleability of the groups' performances may be exemplified by the performance of Group 2 players. Even though Group 2 achieved criterion both when unequal distribution and equal distribution conditions were in effect, Figure 3 shows that players developed what may be called an egalitarian pattern of distribution which resulted in each player betting and winning similar amounts (see Figure 3 , sessions 5 to 9) in successive experimental sessions and a general increase in the betting and winnings: over trials each participant won or lost similar amounts, but there was an increase in efficiency. This was achieved by a coordinated pattern of behavior among participants. That is, if the equal condition was in effect, participants bet an equal number of tokens and distributed their winnings equally. In the unequal condition if a player bet more than the others and received more than the others, then on the following trial a second player would bet highest and receive more tokens. At the end of successive trials all players won similar amounts and as a group they won more by meeting the metacontingency requirements. Even if the subjects couldn't describe the rule "equal or unequal divisions result in more gains," they apparently could state to each other how much they must bet at each trial and they surely could socially reinforce or punish the betting or verbal behavior of other group member to fit the required IBC and produce the aggregated outcome and the cultural consequence. Similarly to what happens in some shaping processes in an operant laboratory, it is not necessary that the subject can describe the contingency to behave under its control.
If this interpretation has any bearing, the results here reported also show that the selection of IBC's and their aggregate outcomes or products (here, the unequal or equal distributions) was tied up with the selection of individual behaviors that emerged as behaviors in relation to other members' behaviors-in other words, to the selection of interlocking behavioral contingencies. In this interpretation, the recurrence of a given aggregate outcome (unequal distribution or equal distribution) was taken as a measure of the selection of interlocking behavioral contingencies (see Figure 2) , and the recurrence of related patterns of individual behavior (here, betting and tokens gathered) in a group as the measure of the selection of the relevant interlocking behavioral contingencies (see Figure 3) . In this interpretation the present report may be taken as a cultural analog of selection of operants by contingencies of reinforcement. Specifically, IBCs having products that meet the requirements of metacontingencies arise from variation and are selected by consequences external to the IBCs and their product.
The present results indicate that variations in a cultural practice, i.e. recurring interlocking behavioral contingencies that lead to given outcomes, may be selected by consequences if these are made dependent on the IBCs' outcome, or on the very relationship between interlocking behavioral contingencies and their aggregate products. More studies are necessary to increase the generality of the present findings. Further studies should investigate the effects of other manipulations such as the number of group members, or the effects of changes in parameters such as the magnitude of the consequences, or the effects of more reversals of the experimental contingencies. Further studies should also investigate behavioral measures of the effects of the experimental manipulations, such as direct measures of participants' interactions, as well as develop methods for directly controlling dimensions of the IBCs. Future studies should also collect data when participants are substituted for other participants. The effects of such generations on the selected interlocking behavioral contingencies are relevant to the concept of metacontingency because they produce cultural lineages (cf. Glenn, 2004; Glenn & Malott, 2004; Malott & Glenn, 2006) . The present study contributes to the behavior analytic literature by providing results from preliminary experimental analysis relevant to the conceptual contributions of Skinner (1953 Skinner ( , 1974 Skinner ( , 1981 and Glenn (1988 Glenn ( , 1991 Glenn ( , 2004 and it shows the possibility of taking complex phenomena to the laboratory by building experimental analogs.
